»Albansk Almanak 2000«

Albanien og Kosóva.
Og lidt om Makedonien, Serbien og Montenegro



Udgiver: Kultursociolog Bjørn Andersen

Kontakt: post@bjoerna.dk




Illustreret. 872 sider i 2 bind. Udgivet marts 2001. Se pris på: Bestillingsliste.



Almanak'en består af:

Overbliksartikler. ... En artikel om Stor-Albanien følger nedenfor.

Tematisk gennemgang af udviklingen i Albanien og Kosóva

Udviklingen i Serbien måned for måned, attentat for attentat - og fra Oppositionens sædvanlige splittelse og frem til dens samling om Vojislav Kostunica og de store omvæltninger i efteråret

Oversigt over Danske bidrag i Albanien, Kosóva og Serbien

Kronologisk oversigt over den omfattende Amerikanske aktivitet i området

Bogen er hverken "Albansk" eller "Serbisk". Jeg forsøger at være så objektiv som det kan lade sig gøre - og at gøre det muligt at se konflikterne fra en række forskellige vinkler.

De enkelte afsnit er suppleret med dokumentationsmateriale: FNs Resolution 1244, valgresultater, udsnit af den Albanske Valglov, interviews med nogle af hovedaktørerne, indtryk og afsnit fra rapporter. Materialet er hentet fra internettet og modtaget fra flittige leverandører på begge sider. Der er hele vejen igennem givet henvisninger til nyttige internetsider, hvor man kan hente yderligere materiale.

Bagest i bind 2 finder man en grundig gennemgang af en håndfuld bøger som det vil være nyttigt at fordybe sig i [kommentarerne findes i en 'nyere' udgave i: »Albanske Studier 2002«]

Erling Bjøl's "International politik" og "Hvordan fred?", Anne Knudsen's disputats om slægsfejder og blodhævn på Korsika: "En ø i Historien", Edith Durham's epokegørende "High Albania" fra 1908, Ismail Kadare's roman "Ufuldendt april" og Faber & Halskov's "Forår i Kosova". Durham's bog kan tages ned fra http://digital.library.upenn.edu/women/durham/albania/albania.html - inklusive alle illustrationerne.

Til sidst er der et stikordsregister på godt 40 sider. Registret er så omfattende for at gøre det nemmere at finde personer og særlige emner. I registret er det markeret når der er biografiske oplysninger på bogens personer.

De kronologiske og tematiske afsnit bygger på de artikler jeg udsender hver uge pr. e-mail. I bogen er artiklerne samlet og organiseret på en overskuelig måde. Man kan abonnere gratis på ugeartiklerne - se nærmere på bjoerna.dk/albanerne.htm

»Albansk Almanak 2000« er en uafhængig fortsættelse af de foregående bøger i serien »Albansk historie«.





Stor-Albanien?

Kampene i øst Kosóva og - i marts 2001 - i Makedonien har aktualiseret spørgsmålet om et Stor-Albanien der skulle omfatte de områder hvor der er et flertal af etniske Albanere, dvs. i Albanien, i Kosóva og i en del af Makedonien.

Der er nogle der går ind for en sådan idé, selv om den - i almindelighed - ikke bliver sagt højt og selv om den ikke indgår i dén politik som UÇPMB i øst Kosóva og UÇK i Makedonien officielt står for. Både UÇPMB og UÇK synes at have mere lokale mål øverst på den politiske dagsorden, ikke dannelsen af et Stor-Albanien, selv om et Stor-Albanien dog godt kan være noget man drømmer om kan blive til noget, men langt ude i fremtiden.

Én af dem der er gået ind for idéen om et Stor-Albanien er den Kosóva Albanske Politiker Rexhep Qosja, som spillede en betydningsfuld rolle op gennem 90'erne og under konflikten i Kosóva, men han led imidlertid et afgørende nederlag i Lokalvalgene i Oktober 2000 og trådte derefter et skridt tilbage. Man skal passe på med at overtolke dette nederlag, men det kan dog forstås som et tydeligt tegn på at den almindelige befolkning - i Kosóva - ikke er overvældende interesseret i idéen, i det mindste ikke når det kommer dertil at den ikke længere skal forstås som en utopisk drøm, men som et politisk mål der står for at skulle realiseres.

Flertallet af Albanerne i Makedonien har nok en vis sympati for Guerilla'erne, især fordi de har bragt Det Albanske Spørgsmål tydeligere op - men synes dog at foretrække at man bruger politiske midler for at nå målene for så stor var den praktiske tilslutning til Guerilla'erne heller ikke.

Alt dette véd Rebellerne, Ekstremisterne, Terroristerne eller Frihedskæmperne - eller hvad man måtte foretrække at kalde dem - udmærket. Når de ikke desto mindre skærpede modsætningerne og indledte guerilla-aktioner er det fordi de er overbevist om at have ret og fordi de mener at befolkningsflertallet - og mange af de Albanske Politikere - er formørkede når de tror at man kan nå til reelle resultater uden militære konfrontationer.

De Albanske Politikere i Kosóva, Albanien og Makedonien er nærmest imod den store Idé. Nogle af dem - og formentlig flertallet - er imod fordi de ikke tror på idéen, mens andre er imod af taktiske grunde og i den aktuelle situation fordi de mener den vil vække for megen modstand i den Vestlige Verden.

Flere af de toneangivende Politikere - som Fatos Nano i Albanien, Hashim Thaçi i Kosóva og Arber Xhaferri i Makedonien - ser gerne et samarbejde hen over grænserne og mødes selv lejlighedsvis.

Fatos Nano mener - i sammenhæng hermed - at man kan komme længere hvis statsgrænser ikke spiller dén rolle som de tidligere har haft. Han mener med andre ord at man fremmer Albanske interesser bedre på dén måde end ved at insistere på et Stor-Albanien, og han véd at støtte fra EU forudsætter at man tænker i en anden retning end mod dannelsen af et Stor-Albanien.

Dertil kommer at de nævnte Politikere er meget skeptiske ved hvem der ville komme til at være tone-angivende i et Stor-Albanien, - de selv - eller de kræfter som i Albanien samler sig om Sali Berisha og i Kosóva om Ibrahim Rugova - to Politikere der tidligere har haft gode relationer og som er enige om at vende sig mod Socialister i enhver form, men som derudover har meget forskellige lokale interesser at varetage.

De etnisk Albanske Politikere er - deres meningsforskelligheder til trods - enige om at ønske én ændring - at Kosóva skal få sin selvstændighed. Desuden er de er enige om at der skal tages vidtgående hensyn til de etniske Albanere i Kosóva hvor de udgør flertallet og i Makedonien hvor de udgør et mindretal på ca. 1/3. De er enige om at den Vestlige Verden skal investere store ressourcer i hele det Albanske område, især i deres særlige del af det. Og de er endelig enige om at NATO skal blive i området for at sikre etnisk Albanske interesser, måske for at lægge låg på modsætningerne - men især for at sikre at Serberne holder sig på plads.

Det er karakteristisk at Regeringen i Albanien stræber efter at få et bedre forhold til Serbien nu hvor Milosevic er sat fra bestillingen. Derved distancerer den sig fra flertallet af Kosóva Albanske Politikere som under ét opfatter Serbiske Politikere som ulve i fåreklæder.

Den Vestlige Verden er ikke indstillet på at give Kosóva selvstændighed - i det mindste ikke nu - og er slet ikke indstillet på at fremme idéen om et Stor-Albanien, men derimod på at fremme en tværgående og mere generel udvikling af området, ... formentlig med Serbien som krumtappen. Det er her afgørende at man går efter en bred og afbalanceret udvikling af hele området og at man ikke glemmer Albanerne for ellers danner man grundlag for nye konflikter.

De aktuelle konflikter fremstår som nationale eller etniske konflikter - ikke mindst i Makedonien hvor ét af de vigtigste krav er anerkendelsen af det Albanske Universitet -, men de materielle modsætninger og uligheder spiller en meget stor rolle som nødvendigt brændstof, akkurat som det var tilfældet i Kosóva i Tito-tiden (Se nærmere i "Fra Kosovo til Kosóva").


Bjørn Andersen, marts 2001 (justeret april 2001).


Tilføjelse: Idéen om et 'Stor Albanien' er undertiden - ikke mindst frem til Kosóva-krigen i 1999 - fremført fra Serbisk side som dét mål man mente at Albanerne i virkeligheden havde. Nogle fremførte 'idéen' fordi de vitterligt troede at Albanerne havde den; andre fremførte den af taktiske grunde. Kunne man nemlig hævde at Albanerne stræbte efter et Stor Albanien, kunne man håbe på at Albanerne tabte noget af dén støtte de fik i USA og forskellige steder i Europa, således under kampene i 1998 og under optakten til krigen i 1999.





030208 Fremtrædende Albanere fra Albanien, Makedonien og Kosóva er mødtes i Pogradec. På billedet ses Arben Xhaferri [Arber Xhaferi; Arben Xhaferi] (Makedonien, nr. 2 fra v.), PM Fatos Nano (Albanien, i centrum), Ali Mehmeti (Makedonien, nr. 2 fra h.) og Udgiver Veton Surroi (Kosóva, yderst th.). »ATA« skriver:

Premier Fatos Nano had an informal meeting in Pogradec on Saturday with chairman of the Democratic Party of Macedonia (PDSH) Arber Xhaferi, chairman of the Democratic Union for Integration (DPI) Ali Mehmeti and analyst Veton Surroi and discussed cooperation among Albanian political parties on processes of European integration. After the meeting Nano said that the motive of this meeting was a significant event of beginning negotiations on the stabilisation - association agreement between Albania and the European Union. "I was pleased to share with my guests the assessments and commitments I shared with other premiers of the neighboring countries and those of the Western Balkans, particularly regarding the political and governing commitment to coexistence and equal evaluation of European institutions in various countries of the Balkans," said the Premier. Further on, Nano confirmed the commitment to jointly fighting the negative phenomena, which, according to him "nourish critical sensitiveness of the EU, the U.S., NATO and global institutions against the Balkans and its component countries regarding trafficking, organised crime and the relatively threatened borders among the Balkan countries by regional and international criminal networks."




Resolution # 1244

Officiel udgave (som blev »fundet« ved årsskiftet 2002/2003) kan findes på: http://bjoerna.dk/kosova/UN-SC-Res-1244.htm. Den udgave der følger nedenfor - og som medtager annex 2 pkt. 10 og en note til sidst - er optrykt i »Albansk Almanak 2000« og i »Albanske Studier 2002«.


Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999

The Security Council,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;

(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;

(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;

(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors' conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999

The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:

- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;

- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;

- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;

- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;

- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;

- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;

- Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.



Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:

- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence;

- Marking/clearing minefields;

- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;

- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below.1 A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:

Withdrawal

- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;

Returning personnel

- Equipment associated with returning personnel;

- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;

- Timetable for their return;

- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;

- Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the international civil mission.



Notes

1 Other required elements:

- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;

- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);

- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals;

- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.




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