Jugoslavisk Forbundspræsident siden efteråret 2000 og indtil Jugoslavien blev erstattet af 'Serbien og Montenegro'.
Forsøgte at blive Præsident for Serbien og fik også flest stemmer, men der blev sammenlagt afgivet for få stemmer til at valget kunne erklæres gyldigt.
Premierminister for Serbien efter Parlamentsvalget i slutningen af 2003 (tiltrådt marts 2004). Regeringen er en mindretalsregering. VicePM er Miroslav Labus fra G17+ (modkandidat i det mislykkede jugoslaviske præsidentvalg), Nyt Serbien og Vuk Draskovic' Fornyelsesbevægelse. Regeringen støttes endvidere af Socialistpartiet (Milosevic' Parti!).
Billedet er fra et nr. af tidsskriftet »Vreme« efter valget 000924. »Pobeda« betyder: Sejr. Født 1944-03-24. Taler Engelsk, Tysk og Fransk - men har så vidt vides ikke været på studieophold i udlandet som Zoran Djindjic. Jurist (eksamen Beograd 1966, masters degree 1970 på afhandlingen »The Political Theory and Practice of the Constitutional Judiciary in Yugoslavia«), Dr. (1974) på afhandlingen »Institutionalized Opposition in Capitalist Political Systems«. Universitetslærer 1970-74. Tvunget til at fratræde da han ikke ville acceptere forskellige Forfatningsændringer i 1974, dvs. de ændringer der gav relativ stor autonomi til Vojvodina og Kosova! Kostunica har aldrig været medlem af Tito's Kommunistparti.
Talte gennem mange år for at man indførte et flerpartisystem, for uden et sådant kunne der ikke etableres et egentligt demokrati. - Fik tilbud om at vende tilbage til sin stilling i 1989, men afslog.
Gift med Zorica Radovic; har ikke børn; holder meget af katte. Har gennem mange år boet i Dorcol, en forstad til Beograd.
Medstifter af Det Demokratiske Parti (1989); uenig med bl.a. Zoran Djindjic - ikke mindst på det nationale spørgsmål. Grundlagde Serbiens Demokratiske Parti (1992), Formand. Deltog i det politiske samarbejde i DEPOS (1992) og i Zajedno (1996; valget 960918). Noterede sig at hans parti tabte pga koalitionssamarbejdet og skuffet over at man ikke nåede hvad man havde sat sig for. ... Medlem af det Serbiske Parlament 1990-97.
Anses for at være en »alvorsmand« og at tænke sig grundigt om før han tager beslutninger. Anses for i mange, ikke mindst politiske, henseender at have »rene hænder«; har således - og i modsætning til Vuk Draskovic - ikke samarbejdet med Milosevic.
Har tidligere foreslået at man burde opstille en kandidat fra Montenegro: Svetozar Marovic ... med henblik på at binde bro over modsætningerne. Forestillede sig at Serbien og Montenegro skal samarbejde, men som selvstændige stater - for de store problemer var først opstået ved »sammenlægningen«. Negativ over for Forfatningen (Zabljak-Forfatningen fra 1992). Har (så vidt vides) sagt at Montenegro må have mulighed for at stå frit, hvis det er dét man vil dér (men har i oktober 2000 også sagt at Forfatningen ikke giver mulighed for at Montenegro eller Kosova bliver selvstændige stater). [Senere er Jugoslavien erstattet af et nyt forbund mellem Serbien og Montenegro].
Kritiserede at Regeringskoalitionen i Montenegro boykottede valgene 0009, eftersom det ville styrke Milosevic, har udtalt at Milosevic og Djukanovic i virkeligheden gavnede hinanden.
Ønsker at man redder hvad man kan redde i Kosova - som han mener fortsat må være en del af Serbien. Mener at man burde have fundet en anden form for »løsning«. Skeptisk - måske negativ - over for Albanerne, dels fordi de ikke ville indgå i det politiske liv i Serbien, dels fordi de - ikke mindst siden NATO-aktionen - har chikaneret Serberne og de andre etniske minoriteter. Kostunica mener at der nu er mange flere Albanere i Kosova end der "oprindelig" var, og konstaterer at mange Serbere og ikke-Albanere er flygtet. Mener man må insistere på at Sikkerhedsrådsresolution 1244 efterleves - herunder mht at sikre tilværelsen for de etniske minoriteter. Har i september 2000 udtalt at Præsident Milosevic har sin del af ansvaret for at det kom til en væbnet konflikt med NATO i 1999.
Kostunica frabad sig »hjælp« fra Amerikanerne til Oppositionen i tiden op til September 2000-valget. Han så hellere at man (evt. midlertidigt) ophævede sanktionerne mod Jugoslavien end at man gav »verbal støtte«; noget mere positiv ift »Europæerne«.
Kostunica forestillede sig (umiddelbart før sin tiltræden som Forbundspræsident) ikke at han ville tage skridt til at udlevere Milosevic til ICTY.
Per Nyholm på »Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten« er (bl.a. i en artikel 000920) stærkt skeptisk over for Kostunica. Nævner at han er nationalist af dyb overbevisning, men at han af mange betragtes som langt mere stueren end Milosevic, erindrer om at dét at have været i opposition til Tito-styret ikke siger meget om hvad man virkeligtstår for og mener at Kostunica »på bunden« ønsker at Serberne skal bestemme hvor der bor Serbere, hvad enten de er i flertal eller ej.
Milosevic, Slobodan
Forbemærkning: Nedenfor trykkes en artikel jeg har fået optaget i »Danskeren« nr. 3, juni 2001 - s. 18f. Bladet udgives af Den Danske Forening.
At jeg har sendt artiklen til bladet skyldes at man havde refereret mig skævt i en artikel om Milosevic, og at man - efter min mening - bør diskutere med dem man er uenige med. Det fører ikke fører til noget fornuftigt at tie »de andre« ihjel eller dét der er værre.
At jeg overhovedet faldt over den skæve passage er ikke så underligt. Med jævne mellemrum foretager jeg nogle brede søgninger på internettet efter »Albanien«, »Kosova«, »Serbien«, ... »Milosevic« osv. - og engang i april 2001 »poppede« den pågældende artikel op, tilmed en artikel hvor jeg selv indgik [klikker du på »artikel« får du hele det pgl. nummer af bladet - som det tager noget tid at downloade og evt. at save].
»Danskeren« har - som det skal være - trykt mit indlæg uden nogen ændringer. Dermed har de fulgt det samme princip som jeg selv bruger - at trykke eventuelle rettelser og indsigelser uden ændringer.
I »Albansk Navnebog 2000« er der en længere biografisk artikel om Slobodan Milosevic.
010422: »Forleden faldt jeg over en passage i »Danskeren« oktober 2000, hvor Peter Neerup Buhl trækker på noget jeg skrev i januar 1999:
»Bjørn Andersen finder det i sit værk Albansk Historie (1999 bd. 1, s. 16) udokumenteret, at Milosevic er en renlivet skurk. Han har handlet ganske, som det i århundreder har været sædvanligt på Balkan, og har vist et sandt mesterskab i at manøvrere mellem modsat rettede kræfter«.
Hvad Peter Neerup Buhl tager mig til indtægt for svarer ikke til hvad jeg skrev den gang - før Rambouillet-forhandlingerne og før NATOs bombninger. Der er udeladt nogle vigtige passager og derved er meningen blevet temmelig fordrejet. Hvad jeg skrev var følgende:
»Det er nemt for os i Vesten at komme til at opfatte en person som Slobodan Milosevic som renlivet skurk, - og formentlig er der et vist element af sandhed i en sådan vurdering, for han har uden tvivl et betydeligt ansvar for mange af de rædselsvækkende ting der er sket på Balkan i de seneste år, - men en sådan opfattelse hjælper ikke på ret meget og får ikke udviklingen til at gå en fornuftig vej.
Der er dem der mener at Milosevic ikke har kunnet handle meget anderledes hvis han skulle kunne opretholde sine magtpositioner - men i hvert fald har han handlet ganske analogt til hvad der i århundreder har været sædvanligt på Balkan.
Uanset disse vurderinger har han en væsentlig tilslutning i sit »bagland« - og han har vist et sandt mesterskab i at manøvrere mellem modsatrettede interne kræfter - og mellem forskellige ydre kræfter«.
Så vidt jeg forstår Peter Neerup Buhl's artikel er hensigten at vise at »man« havde konstrueret et fjendebillede af Milosevic, at Milosevic også havde nogle gode sider som man har overset - og at det kan være at »man« var efter ham, fordi han havde mandet sig op imod Muslimerne som siges at have indledt en demografisk aggression mod os. Endelig minder Peter Neerup Buhl om at Albanerne i Kosova har begået mange uhyrligheder mod Serberne.
Der er noget om det Peter Neerup Buhl skriver, men i det grundlæggende tror jeg han er gået rent galt i byen når han forsøger at »hvidvaske« Milosevic.
Jeg synes også man skal hæge om de gode sider i den vestlige kultur, men det var ikke dét Milosevic gjorde - faktisk kom han til at gøre det modsatte. Vestlig kultur er mange ting - også ting der går i forskellige retninger -, men nogle af de bærende og fremadrettede elementer i den er at være åbne over for andre, at være nysgerrige, at kunne samarbejde med andre, at være demokratiske - men også at være teknologisk og økonomisk innovative. Milosevic' bidrag går i en anden retning selv om han måske begyndte med at ville modernisere den jugoslaviske økonomi. På en vis - formalistisk - måde fulgte han demokratiets spilleregler, men da det kom til stykket var han med til at forvride demokratiet og til at spænde ben for en fri meningsudveksling.
Der er mange gode grunde til at forholde sig kritisk til de billeder som NATO, forskellige landes udenrigsministre og medierne har givet os af såvel Milosevic som af Serberne, Albanerne og NATOs krigsførelse i Kosova. Af samme grund må det påskønnes når der fremlægges supplerende eller alternative informationer ... - hvis de vel at mærke er holdbare og dækkende.
Det er interessant hvad man har fundet frem af Milosevic' skriverier, - helt sikkert - men efter min mening er det langt mere interessant hvad Milosevic har gjort eller haft ansvar for i dén tid han har været ved magten. Noget af det vigtigste er at Serberne i flere år har været på kollisionskurs med størstedelen af Europa, og at det Serbiske samfund er blevet helt forvredet - både politisk og økonomisk. Eftersom Serbien er et centralt land på Balkan har de miserable forhold dér haft tunge konsekvenser for de øvrige lande og for de indbyrdes relationer. Det er derfor overordentlig befriende at det omsider er lykkedes for den meget sammensatte Serbiske opposition at sætte Milosevic fra bestillingen, og det bliver spændende at se om udviklingen vil fortsætte i en positiv retning.
Vender vi os til konflikten i Kosova kan man konstatere at Serberne og Albanerne aldrig har haft det rigtigt godt med hinanden; det er - eksempelvis - en almindelig konstatering at Serbere og Albanere sjældent giftede sig med hinanden. Når Serberne (i lange stræk) havde overtaget, undertrykte de Albanerne; i tiden mellem 1' og 2' Verdenskrig optrådte man således som en renlivet kolonimagt. Når Albanerne (i kortere stræk) havde overtaget, undertrykte de til gengæld Serberne. Undertrykkelsen kunne være af økonomisk, social eller kulturel art, men i særlig tilspidsede situationer kunne den få karakter af væbnede konflikter - ikke mindst i de seneste år.
I den forbindelse må nævnes at både Serberne og Albanerne har været flinke til at trække på Historien, eller - for at være mere korrekt - flinke til at trække dét frem om »sig selv« og »de andre« som man kunne bruge som ammunition. Det var der ingen der havde ære af, og det var med til at modsætningerne stivnede og blev endnu mere forkrampede - og også til at fornuftige løsningsmuligheder »fordampede«.
Milosevic bærer en stor del af ansvaret for at modsætningerne udviklede sig til en omfattende militær konflikt og til et omfattende flygtningeproblem først med hensyn til Albanerne, dernæst med hensyn til Serberne i Kosova; der er dog også andre der har et ansvar - ikke mindst Albanerne -, men vestmagterne og de internationale organisationer er - mildt sagt - ikke skyldfri. Bombningerne i 1999 indebar - hvor nødvendige NATO-lederne end syntes de var - at krisen eskalerede og at de grundlæggende konflikter i Kosova blev om muligt vanskeligere at løse.
Det kan godt være at en del af modsætningerne har en religiøs karakter, men i Kosova har hverken de ortodokse kristne eller muslimerne været påfaldende missionske (det er der almindelig enighed om blandt forskere og andre iagttagere). Religionen spiller dog en vis rolle, men det er fordi den på forskellige måder indgår i kulturen - akkurat som en »almindelig dansker« er præget af at være vokset op i et protestantisk samfund selv om han måske slet ikke er medlem af Folkekirken.
Både Serberne og Albanerne hører til på Balkan (men hvem der kom »først« og hvem der for flere hundrede år siden gjorde det ene eller det andet - kan vi ikke bruge til noget konstruktivt) og derfor må man finde ud af hvordan de kan leve med hinanden. ... Formentlig må man acceptere at Kosova er blevet opdelt i en mindre Serbisk og en større Albansk del.
Jeg synes det er uendelig sørgeligt at Serberne og Albanerne ikke kan eller vil leve side om side med hinanden i Kosova, men krigen - og de uhyrligheder der blev begået under den og efter den - er en meget væsentlig årsag hertil. Jeg synes man fra alle sider må anstrenge sig for at der - med tiden - kan udvikle sig frugtbare relationer hen over grænserne, først økonomiske - siden måske kulturelle og politiske. Dette vil kræve mange ressourcer og stor opmærksomhed fra »vores« side, ressourcer og opmærksomhed som vi burde have kunnet bruge på andre konflikter og katastrofer rundt om i verden.
Til slut skal jeg nævne at jeg har skrevet en del mere - og en del mere nuanceret - om Milosevic siden den citerede bog, således i Albansk historie bd. 2 som handler om Kosova's historie og om krigen i 1999, i bd. 3 som bl.a. gennemgår relevante bøger om Albanerne m.fl. og i bd. 4 som er en Navnebog over forskellige personer fra den Albanske historie. Se evt. mine internetsider om Albanien og Kosova på adressen: http://bjoerna.dk/albanerne.htm«
Ivan Stambolic, former president of the Serbian presidency, disappeared in Belgrade park Kosutnjak in the morning on August 25. Since he did not return home as usual from his regular jogging session, the members of his family first searched for him in the Kosutnjak park fearing that he might have fallen sick. As they could not find him, they reported his disappearance to the police.
The only eyewitness, a guard at the parking lot of the »Golf« restaurant, saw Stambolic some time after 10 a.m. sitting on a bench and a white van stopping in front of him. When he looked that way again, after some twenty seconds, both the white van and Ivan [were not [?]] there. The media learnt from Stambolic's neighbours that a white van had been parked for weeks in front of the building where he lived before his disappearance. According to Rade Paunovic, a lawyer and a friend of the family, Ivan himself had noticed this vehicle near his apartment building and said: »If they want to get rid of me, they will do it.«
The Beginning
Ivan Stambolic was born in 1936 in the village of Brezova near Ivanjica, in a Communist family. The parents intended university education for his three brothers, while Ivan was educated as a metalsmith and was subsequently employed at the Rakovica Motor Company. Being ambitious he enrolled in Belgrade University Law School and studied while still working. He met Slobodan Milosevic during his studies who was to follow in his footsteps all the way to the top of the political hierarchy.
At the time when Stambolic was a director of a Belgrade company »Tehnogas«, Milosevic was his deputy. Following Stambolic's departure from Tehnogas, Milosevic filled the vacant position of the company's director. While Stambolic was Prime Minister of the Serbian government, the centre of political power in the republic, Milosevic was president of Beogradska banka (Belgrade Bank), the centre of economic power at the time. In April 1984 Stambolic left the presidential post of the Serbian League of Communists Belgrade City Committee to become the head of the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee appointing Milosevic to his former post despite opposition on the part of some older and more experienced Communists.
Ivan Stambolic and Slobodan Milosevic, file photo, 1986.
In January 1986, after the customary party leadership reshuffle, Ivan Stambolic became Serbian president. His support for Milosevic was crucial when a new president of the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee was to be chosen. Milosevic was replaced by Dragisa Buca Pavlovic at the post of the Belgrade City Committee president.
After becoming the head of the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee, Milosevic strengthened the party's apparatus gathering round himself many associates and creating a splinter group which openly confronted the faction led by Dragica Pavlovic and Ivan Stambolic in the spring of 1987. A seemingly innocent incident was taken advantage of to spark a conflict which began with launching an attack on Dragisa Pavlovic at a session of the presidency of the Serbian League of Communists Central Committee and ended with political liquidation of Ivan Stambolic in front of the television cameras on September 23 and 24, 1987. For several months more Stambolic remained Serbian president, but was forced to resign at a session of the Serbian presidency due to a huge pressure exerted by the press and the public on him. Stambolic almost entirely withdrew from the Serbian political life.
Immediately after his retirement from politics, Stambolic experienced a horrible personal tragedy. In a traffic accident which had taken place under suspicious circumstances, his twenty-four-year-old daughter Bojana was killed. Milosevic attended the funeral. Stambolic's wife Kaca refused to shake his hand, and after the funeral the two men whose friendship had lasted for a quarter of the century, never met again.
Exchange of Roles
After his resignation, at the proposal of Ante Markovic in November 1987, Stambolic became director of the Yugoslav Bank for International Cooperation (JUBMES) founded by 182 companies from the whole of former Yugoslavia. The purpose of this credit bank was to facilitate Yugoslav companies' access to foreign markets. New president of the Serbian presidency and former Belgrade Bank director, Slobodan Milosevic, did not interfere with the Stambolic's appointment to this post since he felt powerful enough not to perceive this as a threat to himself.
When Yugoslav wars began tearing the country apart, JUBMES bank reduced its activities in an attempt to survive and preserve its capital worth over 300 million US dollars. In 1997 the federal government took over the bank and appointed Miodrag Zecevic as a new director. Zecevic had previously been for quite some time a director of the Belgrade Bank branch in Paris. He had been held in French prison during an investigation into the charges of embezzlement and illegal business dealings. However, after our 'powerful' diplomacy's intervention, Zecevic had been released and the affair had been soon hushed up.
A Return to Public Life
Eight years after his fall, in April 1995, Stambolic re-emerged on the public scene. At the invitation of the Serb Citizens' Council, Belgrade Circle, a group of intellectuals, organised a three-day visit of about fifty the most prominent intellectuals to Sarajevo still under siege at the time. Among them was Ivan Stambolic who brought along with him the JUBMES bank's aid in medicines. In Sarajevo, in front of the cameras of over thirty international and Bosnian televisions, he gave his first interview after years of silence. Obrad Savic, the president of the Belgrade Circle, said that one could feel the excitement mounting among those present in the congressional hall of the Holiday Inn hotel in Sarajevo before the official opening of the Serb Citizens' Council assembly session.
»Everyone knew that something important was going to happen - for the first time in so many years Ivan Stambolic was about to speak. He spoke very calmly in an aristocratic political tone void of hate speech, irony or cynicism. He spoke a language marked by solemn seriousness, responsibility and unbelievable amount of information. The tone of his voice revealed apprehension and concern over what had happened before and what was yet to happen. Unlike Milosevic and the most of the opposition politicians, he did not resort to misleading strategy of manipulation.«
Utter lack of common decency and proper manners, bordering on obscenity, was further exemplified by Markovic's cynical remark that »this missing person would have to explain to his wife where he had been for such a long time if he returned home«.
The group of intellectuals visiting the Bosnian capital was labelled as »traitors going to Sarajevo to bow to Alija Izetbegovic«. Still impassioned viewers of Belgrade NTV Studio B voted this visit a negative event of the week. Ironically, the crossing of Vojislav Seselj (ultra-rightist Serbian Radical Party leader) and several thousand of his followers across the Serbian-Bosnian border was voted a positive event of the week. Nevertheless, NTV Studio B broadcast an interview with Stambolic produced by Video Weekly.
A collection of late Slobodan Inic's interviews with Ivan Stambolic entitled »Put u bespuce« (»Road to Nowhere«) was published the same year. Except for this book, in which Stambolic presented his views on the political turmoil of the late '80s and the end of his political career, the public was also stirred up that year by an unauthorised interview which Stambolic gave to Belgrade weekly Telegraf, owned at the time by Momcilo Djorgovic and late Slavko Curuvija.
Following the Stambolic's disappearance, word had it that the motivation of the people who commissioned the kidnapping could be explained by Stambolic's wish to return onto the political scene. However, very little is known about his political activities during the period after the Eighth Session of the Serbian Communist Party's Central Committee. One could say that he was close to the centre-left political option. His name was mentioned together with Miladin Zivotic, Misa Nikolic, Zarko Korac, Rasim Ljajic and Nenad Canak in connection to an attempt of establishing the Social Democrat Alliance of Serbia by the end of 1994 and early 1995. Stambolic attended the founding session of the Social Democrat Union in the spring of 1996.
Where is Ivan Stambolic?
Even though a former Serbian president disappeared, there has been not a word from the police for more than two weeks. Evidence given by the guard at the parking lot of the »Golf« restaurant was leaked to the press through the statements of the Stambolic family members. When the journalists of Belgrade weekly NIN tried to track down possibly the only eyewitness to the Stambolic's disappearance, they were told at the »Golf« restaurant that he was transferred to another workplace.
Apart from silence on the part of the Belgrade police department, the fact that the state media did not report the probable abduction of the former Serbian president was also conspicuous. On Wednesday, August 30, the regime's daily Politika, and one day later, another state-run daily Politika ekspres published articles focusing on business dealings and contacts of Ivan Stambolic with the companies from the Republic of Srpska and Montenegro alleging that there lay the motives for his kidnapping. Two days later, however, Politika informed the public that, »apparently, there were no material evidence« to corroborate the claims of his alleged business dealings with the Republic of Srpska and Montenegro, which could have been the reasons for his abduction »since the contracts had been signed (in Stambolic's presence) by other people«. Katarina Stambolic vehemently denied on August 31 that her husband had a company registered to his name because »he was well aware what kind of a state he was living in«, going on to say: »What the state media published yesterday is ludicrous; it has nothing to do with truth«.
Yugoslav United Left spokesman and Federal Telecommunications Minister, Ivan Markovic, tried to account for persistent silence of the regime's broadcasters and newspapers saying that »the state media had not reported Ivan Stambolic's disappearance probably because this was an irrelevant information«.
»Your assumption is«, Markovic told a press conference for the Yugoslav Left journalists, »that Federal Telecommunications Minister should know whether someone went for a walk and why he did not return home. You must ask that person who walked away.« Only five days later Markovic 'contributed' even more to the ongoing investigation with another preposterous statement. Asked by the viewers of the local television station TV5 in Uzice about Stambolic's whereabouts, Markovic replied: »We'll know when they find him.« Utter lack of common decency and proper manners, bordering on obscenity, was further exemplified by his cynical remark that »this missing person would have to explain to his wife where he had been for such a long time if he returned home«.
Unlike Markovic, former Serbian Interior Minister Radmilo Bogdanovic was »surprised« at Stambolic's disappearance. »Honestly, this has taken me by surprise. I simply can't believe that someone today could be kidnapped in such a way, that someone could be just taken away against his will, but people don't even comment on such things,« he told B2-92. Bogdanovic also said that he could not possibly know what might be the background of this abduction.
Nonetheless, rumours speculating on the background of the Stambolic's kidnapping have been widely circulated in public. The opposition has more than once strongly condemned the incident and inefficient investigation, openly accusing the regime of being responsible for the abduction. Some public figures saw the reason for the kidnapping in possible candidacy of Ivan Stambolic for the upcoming presidential election. Stories about his intention to run for president were leaked to the public a month before his disappearance. As a guest of the Citizens' Alliance in Subotica on July 24, Stambolic presented his view of the current political situation and he did not dismiss the possibility of his returning to the political scene. Soon after his visit to Subotica, the people from Sumadija and Vojvodina urged him to run for president, which he allegedly accepted providing the Serbian Democratic Opposition (DOS), the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) and the Socialist Democratic Party of Montenegro (DPS) backed his nomination. Vuk Draskovic, the Renewal Movement leader, stated, after his disappearance, that thousands of signatures had been collected for the nomination of the former Serbian president. Most of the signatures, according to Draskovic, came from members of the Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist Party of Serbia. However, both Nikola Barovic and Katarina Stambolic dismissed the reports about his possible nomination for president. Stambolic's wife emphasised that »he would not even think about taking part in the presidential election race because I would not let him do it«. Yet, the foreign media still speak of Stambolic as an ideal opponent to Milosevic since he would succeed in winning the votes of older people and both members and supporters of the Socialist Party of Serbia who would recognise in Stambolic »an honest Communist, loyal to Yugoslavia and the work of comrade Tito«.
Regardless of an abundance of speculations and denials, the fact remains that Slobodan Milosevic himself, on September 4, voiced his view on the matter, though not in public but in a phone conversation with the former Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov. At the request of Stambolic's wife, Gligorov asked Milosevic whether he knew what had happened to Stambolic. Milosevic said that he »was not behind the disappearance of Ivan Stambolic«. »The investigation has been hampered because Stambolic's family did not report him missing for several hours, by which time«, said Milosevic, »those who abducted him could already have taken him out of the country«.
Katarina Stambolic said that even though he might not have been personally behind the abduction, this still did not mean that Milosevic had no knowledge of who was behind the kidnapping. She went on to say that immediately after her husband's disappearance she phoned the residence of the Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic to inform him so that it was untrue that she had been late in reporting her husband missing.
»Everyone knew that something important was going to happen - for the first time in so many years Ivan Stambolic was about to speak. He spoke very calmly in an aristocratic political tone void of hate speech, irony or cynicism. He spoke a language marked by solemn seriousness, responsibility and unbelievable amount of information. The tone of his voice revealed apprehension and concern over what had happened before and what was yet to happen. Unlike Milosevic and the most of the opposition politicians, he did not resort to misleading strategy of manipulation.«
On September 7, a denial came from the Kiro Gligorov's cabinet. »Milosevic could not have said something like that since Mr. Gligorov did not ask the question in this context. Milosevic mostly spoke of the investigation being hampered since the family had been late in reporting his disappearance to the police, and the impression was that Milosevic was closely following the work of the investigating organs,« according to Belgrade daily Danas, quoting the sources from the former Macedonian president's cabinet. Stambolic's lawyer Nikola Barovic told Danas that his disappearance was reported some time after 12 a.m., when all the hospitals were also contacted, going on to say that the police did react until 6 p.m. when a police officer went to the scene of Stambolic's disappearance with his son Veljko.
On September 8, there was a minor turn of events. Stambolic's wife Katarina, lawyer Nikola Barovic and Belgrade daily Danas received an anonymous phone call informing them that former Serbian president Ivan Stambolic had been seen being removed from Belgrade's main prison seven days ago. The anonymous caller referred to his cousin, an employee of the Belgrade Central Prison, as the source of information. Katarina Stambolic immediately reported this information to the police. Nikola Barovic tried to verify the information, but he was told at the Belgrade central police station that »all the details would be available to the public after the completion of the ongoing investigation«.
At the time when this text was written (September 11), no information as to Stambolic's whereabouts was available. The police, allegedly investigating the incident, still keep silent.
